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Abstract Arguments for and against national health insur-
ance (NHI) for South Africa are illuminated by the
experiences of other middle-income developing
countries. In many Latin American and Asian
countries the majority of their populations are cov-
ered by NHI, coverage having steadily increased
over the last decade. Patterns of care under NHI
tend to be inefficient - hospital-oriented, highly
specialised and technical, with excessive investiga-
tion, surgery and medication, neglect of primary
care and severe cost escalation. In some cases,
however, urban primary care has been promoted
through polyclinics and health maintenance organ-
isations. Inequalities.in funding, access and utilisa-
tion exist between the insured and uninsured,
between strata of the insured, and between urban
and rural areas. These inequalities have at times
been ameliorated by expaRsion of coverage, sub-
sidisation of poorer beneficiaries and initiation of
programmes that extend care to rural areas. NHI
can improve or impair efficiency and equity in
health care, depending on structures and processes
ofrevenue generation, payment and organisation of
care. These depend in turn on how those likely to
lose or gain from each option exercise their collec-
tive power.
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Proposals for national health insurance (NHI) inSouth Africa have been discussed from a number ofperspectives in recent years.'-' World Bank' and
International Labour Organisation' publications have also
advocated NHl as a solution to inadequate health financ-
ing in developing countries. NHl is but one of many
potential sources of health care financing, but is the
major source in many developed and middle-income
developing countries. It is usually based on compulsory
contributions by employers and employees in the form of
a payroll tax. Individuals unable to afford compulsory
insurance may be excluded from benefits, but could
instead be subsidised by the premiums of wealthier work-
ers and/or government contributions. The range of health
care to which beneficiaries are entitled varies. NHl could
cover only a basic package of services, leaving individuals
to purchase additional care or insurance themselves, in
which case definition of the basic package would be a key
Issue.
NHl may be conceived narrowly as a financing mech-
anism, or more broadly as an integral part of a national
health care programme. While the feasibility of rHI
financing needs detailed investigation, the potential
impact of :NHI on the nature and distribution of health
care provision is of even greater concern.
Proponents argue that NHl could allow central con-
trol over private health expenditure which could be
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directed to the most efficient forms of care, such as pre-
ventive and promotive services.' Additionally, it is
claimed that NHI can increase fmancial resources for
public health care bener than can general taxation,
because people are more willing to pay insurance contri-
butions in return for a tangible benefit, and because a
health insurance fund carmot easily be appropriated by
governments to finance non-health expenditures. Critics
warn that NHI, unless strongly regulated, may impair
efficiency by encouraging excessive specialised care for
the insured and aggravate inequity by divening financial
and professional resources away from the uninsured poor
who are most in need. Both sets of arguments seem plau-
sible, and should be evaluated in the light of the experi-
ences of other countries.
The middle-income countries of Asia and Latin
America are more economically and socially comparable
to South Africa than are developed nations or the poorer
countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The former countries
have similar per capita incomes to South Africa" indicat-
ing that similar levels of health care are affordable (Table
I). They also have similarly unequal income distributions,
making equity considerations imponant.' Many Latin
American countries have more than 50 years of experi-
ence of social health insurance, and some Asian countries
have more recently anained near-universal insurance
coverage.
The aim of this review was to examine the available
evidence of the impact of national health insurance on
equity and efficiency in health care in the middle-income
developing countries of Latin America and Asia, so as to
inform the choices facing South Africa. In addition, low-
income countries with substantial insurance coverage are
considered, most notably China. The terms 1'.THI, social
health insurance and social security are used interchange-
ably in this paper.
Insurance coverage
Less than 20% of South Africans have private health
insurance: the rest depend largely on public services or
out-of-pocket payments for private services.· Could NHl
significantly increase this proponion? In this paper, 'cov-
erage' applies to the proponion of the population entitled
to insurance-funded care. Entitlement may not entail
access to services, as will be discussed later.
Coverage has increased steadily in most Latin
American countries, starting in the 1930s and accelerat-
ing in the last rwo decades (Table I). Virtually the whole
populations of Brazil, Costa Rica" and South Korea '0 are,
at least nominally, entitled to insurance-funded care. In
Brazil universal entitlement was simply decreed by the
government during the late 1980s, although a large pro-
ponion of the population did not contribute." Insurance
often covers only a proponion of costs, and beneficiaries'
co-payments may be substantial, as in Korea (20 -
30%),'0 China (up to 50%) and the Philippines (30% of
hospital costs): with maximum limits on payments.
In most countries, compulsory insurance began with
urban workers employed by large enterprises in a few
economic sectors, and gradually extended to other sec-
tors and smaller enterprises. Workers' dependents mayor
may not be covered.
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TABLE!.
Economic, demographic and health indices, and health insurance coverage in selected countries*
GNP per Urban Life Health insurance
capita Population population expectancy Infant mortality coverage
Country (USS) (million) (%) (yrs) rate (per 1 000) (% population) Sourcest
Low income
China 370 1 134 56 70 29 40 10,12
Average 350 3058 38 62 69
Low-middle income
Bolivia 630 7,2 51 60 160 30 13
Philippines 730 62 43 64 72 37 10
Peru 1 160 22 70 63 69 19 41
Thailand 1420 56 23 66 27 39 5
Turkey 1630 56 61 67 60 35 10
Costa Rica 1900 2,8 47 75 16 100 10,1-3
Chile 1940 13 86 72 17 13
Argentina 2370 32 86 71 29 75 10
Average 1530 629 52 65 51
Upper-middle income
Mexico 2490 86 73 70 39 60 41
S. Africa 2530 36 60 62 66 20 8,20
Venezuela 2560 20 84 70 34 50 10
Uruguay 2560 3,1 86 73 21 67 41-
Brazil 2680 150 75 66 57 100 10
S. Korea 5400 43 72 71 17 100 11
Average 3410 458 71 68 45
High income
Average 19590 816 77 77 8
'A11 data are for 1990 except insurance coverage estimates which are for various years between 1985 and 1990.
tAll data from reference 6, except insurance coverage estimates from sources cited in last column.
TABLE tt.
Ranges of resource supply and health insurance cover-
age between least-served and best-served regions in
each country
resource. In Brazil the numbers of doctors per 10 000
population were 17,5 in the south-east, 6,9 in the nonh-
east and 6,6 in the nonh" In South Korea the corres-
ponding figures were 7 in urban areas and 1,2 in rural
areas.'o Varying levels of inequality between and within
other countries are shown in Table IT (these ranges can
give a misleading impression of differences in inequality
between countries, as countries with smaller regions tend
to show greater ranges).
Extension of insurance to rural populations has usually
been restricted by these people's inability to afford premi-
ums, or by shonages of rural services. Rural Koreans were
reluctant to pay insurance contributions, as the lack of
rural services made benefits unlikely." In Brazil and
Mexico, special funds subsidised by the government and
social security, were established to extend coverage to
rural areas.9,12,I3 Brazil also financed insurance for farm
workers with a tax on certain agricultural products. '4
Extension of rural health care has been especially success-
ful in Costa Rica, but this was largely financed through
the government, assisted by foreign aid!'"
For South Africa, the feasibility of increasing coverage
depends largely on the numbers of people in the urban
formal economy, as it would be difficult to extract contri-
butions from the large proponion of the population that is
unemployed, employed in the informal sector, or living in
rural areas. Almost 5 million workers - about 46% of the
economically active population - currently contribute to
compulsory unemployment insurance.'· Research is nec-
essary to detennine to what extent these workers and their
employers are willing and able to pay for NHI and, if
dependents were to be included, what proponion of the















































South Africa suffers from an extremely unequal distribu-
tion of health care resources, whether comparisons are
made between racial categories, private or public care, or
between homeland and other areas. 8,17,18 It is instructive to
consider inequalities in countries with substantial NHI
coverage.
While 'equal care for equal need' is a good definition
of equity, 'need' is difficult to measure accurately. For
purposes of comparison, given the gross inequalities in
developing countries, population size remains a useful,
though crude, index of a population's need. Ratios of
expenditure or health professionals to population are the
most readily available indices of health care distribution.
Doctors are invariably the most unequally distributed
• Homeland.
tMetropolitan.*Non-metropolitan.
Insured people usually have more and better health
care than do the uninsured, and coverage is invariably
higher in urban than in rural areas. In most countries, the
wealthy are most likely to be insured. In Brazil'9 and the
Dominican Republic,20 for example, coverage increased
with increasing income level and job status. Unequal cov-
erage may exist even within households, when workers'
dependents are not covered, as in Peru," or pay higher
fees, as in China." In the course of time, expansion of
coverage has proceeded in order of decreasing wealth.
Inequalities also exist among the insured. Entitlement
to care does not guarantee that care is provided. Local
______________________________---J..'-_15_5__~
TABLE Ill.
Proportion of economically active population entitled to
health insurance benefits, and proportion of total public
sector (social security plus government) health expendi-
ture consumed by social security in Latin American
countries in 197719
Of particular concern is the tendency of doctors to
move from public service into private practice. NHI has
typically increased demand and financing for private care.
Thus Abel-Smith27 argues that an ample supply of docrors
is a prerequisite for NHI. In Latin America, a profusion of
private medical schools has helped increase supply to
meet the demand.' However, despite relatively high doc-
ror/population ratios, doctors are still largely unavailable
in rural areas.
NHI has the potential ro redistribute resources and
wealth from richer to poorer, but it may do the opposite.
A key objective of NHI is the subsidisation of poorer and
sicker people by the wealthier and healthier, as premiums
do not depend on individual health risk, but are usually
based on income. Whether l\,T}ll does redistribute wealth
depends on the distributions of payments and benefits in
relation to income. Income tax is usually progressive, i.e.
a higher percentage of income is taxed as income increas-
es. NHI contributions are also progressive in Costa Rica,"
as in France and Germany," but are regressive in Korea,
where a low ceiling on maximum contributions means
that higher earners contribute a lower proporrion of their
income." While premiums are ostensibly shared between
services may not exist. User fees, time and transpon COStS,
and lack of knowledge of the benefits of care may deter
people from utilisation, especially the rural poor. In
Mexico City, social security clinics were located far from
the insured residents of poor suburbs, who preferred ro
pay private practitioners closer ro home." In Brazil, social
security spent twice as much per capita in the richer south-
east of the country as in the poorer nonh-east. ,. Utilisation
rates among insured Brazilians were twice as high in the
south-east as in the nonh-east, four times as high in urban
as in rural areas, and ten times as high in the urban south-
east as in the rural nonh-east.' Insured Koreans' utilisation
rates increased with increasing income, especially for hos-
pitals." As an example from Africa, one hospital in Zaire
found that, compared with uninsured people, the likeli-
hood of utilisation was 22 times higher in those fully
insured, and 7,5 times higher in those panly insured."
These examples show that insurance coverage is not in
itself sufficient ro ensure access ro care.
There is a danger that l\,T}ll may drain scarce resources,
such as finance and professionals, from government health
services. Social security consumed disproporrionately large
shares of public health finance in most Latin American
countries in the 1970s (Table III). As coverage increases,
government expenditure on the uninsured, and on preven-
tive services, may decline. Roemer" claims that govern-
ment health spending has generally been maintained dur-
ing expansion of social security. In Costa Rica, expansion
of social security was accompanied by a marked increase
in the government supply of primary care..,l2,2; In Uruguay,
by contrast, government expenditure and the quality of its
care declined as insurance increased." Similarly, increased
social security spending in Brazil was also accompanied by




























employers and workers, it may be impossible ro determine
who ultimately pays, as employers can shift their costs
onto workers (through lower wage increases), or ontO
consumers (through higher prices) depending on labour
and commodity markets. 28
NHI may also be regressive if government subsidies
transfer tax money, drawn partly from consumption taxes
paid by the poor, ro health care for the wealthier. Forms
of government subsidy of health insurance include
(z) direct payments into insurance funds; (iz) employer
contributions for government workers; (iiz) tax-deductible
premiums; (iv) provision of public secror care to insured
patients at below-cost prices; and (v) professional train-
ing. In China, government subsidies of health insurance
were markedly greater for wealthier urban workers than
for the rural poor." Government subsidies may however
be targeted at the poor, as in the Dominican Republic,
where subsidies increased with decreasing income of
beneficiaries.,.
The direction of redistrihution depends not only on
who pays, but also on the ratio of benefits ro contribu-
tions. Despite the inequalities of Brazilian health care,
social security transfers wealth from richer to poorer
regions. While the poorer north-east contributed 9% of
revenue, it received 17% of expenditure. The wealthier
south-east contributed 63% of revenue, but only received
53% of expendirure.' The city of Sao Paulo contributed
42% of revenue, but drew 24% of spending.'· Poorer
Brazilians generally received more health care than they
paid for. Public expenditure on health increased the pro-
porrion of rotal income that went to the poorest 20% of
families in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic and Uruguay.'· Unforrunately the latter data do
not distinguish the effects of social security from those of
government services.
South Korean health insurance, by contrast, appears
ro aggravate inequality, for two reasons. 11 Firstly, high co-
payments and obligatory 'gifts' ro doctors deter the poor
from using health services, especially hospitals and spe-
cialists. Secondly, higher earners have more dependents,
many of whom are elderly. Yeon ll showed that benefit-ro-
contribution ratios were 25 - 30% higher for wealthier
than for poorer beneficiaries, indicating that the wealthy
gained more from health insurance- than did the poor.
Indices of overall income distribution increased when
health care benefits were included in their calculation,
compared with when they were excluded.
South Africa has a siIDilarly unequal distribution of
health care resources as do all these countries, whether
one compared geographical areas, racial categories, or
public and private sectors. Doctors appear to be the most
unequally. distributed resource. Doctor/population ratios
were 11 times higher and bed/population ratios 1,9 times
higher in the country as a whole than in rural 'home-
lands' .,",JO and doctor/population ratios were 6,8 times
higher in the private than in the public sector. 18 Health
care expenditure per capita in 1987 was 4,3 times higher
for whites, and 2,5 times higher for Asians, than for
blacks. 17 Although less than 20% of the population has
private insurance coverage, the private sector consumes
2,8% of GDP and has 59% of doctors, while public ser-
vices for the uninsured 80% received 3,2% of GDP, and
employ 41 % of doctors. 18 Government subsidies ro pri-
vate insurance include the last four methods mentioned
above.
If health insurance in South Africa, whether private
for-profit or compulsory HI, remains confined to a
minority of the population, and if it continues to drain
financial and professional resources away from the public
service, it will aggravate inequality. If, however, NHI
coverage is universal, and if services to the rural and peri-
urban poor are extended, with subsidisation through tax




Efficiency of health care refers to health effects achieved
in relation to resources used. It has become increasingly
apparent that increased expenditures on highly technical,
specialised and hospital-based care have not led to com-
mensurate improvements in health. By contrast, marked
health improvements have resulted from measures ensur-
ing universal access to essential curative and preventive
services through the primary health care approach. 32
While available data do not allow comparison between
countries of health benefits per unit of expenditure, the
efficiency of various health systems can be inferred indi-
rectly from the prevailing panems of care.
Fee-for-service payment for private health care has
impaired efficiency by encouraging excessive medication,
surgery, hospitalisation, and doctor consultations in South
Africa.'I,)3;>! Costs to private insurance of medication and
hospitalisation increased by 36% and 49% respectively
between 1989 and 1990." The public health service is
also excessively hospital-oriented, with 43% of the total
health budget devoted to 13 teaching hospitals."
How efficient have panems of care been under 1'\THI in
other countries? Health care under NHI in Latin America
and Asia has typically been excessively costly, hospital-ori-
ented, specialised, highly technical, and urban based. The
greatest inefficiencies do not necessarily arise directly
from NHI itself, but rather from the perverse incentives of
fee-for-service reimbursement of private care providers,
which reward excessive hospitalisation, investigation and
treatment. Levels of care are typically poorly defined, with
the hospital as the usual first point of contact in countries
such as Brazil3• and South Korea. 11,2' In Brazil, the propor-
tion of the social security budget directed to hospitals
increased from 40% in the 1960s to 50% in the 1980s."
Brazilians receiving private ambulatory care are eight
times as likely to be admitted to hospital as those attend-
ing public facilities.' In Brazil, the proporrion of hospital
inpatients receiving radiography and laboratory tests
increased 2 - 3 times from 1970 to 1981.36 South Korea,
with a population of 43 million,. has 28 hospitals equip-
ped for hean transplants, 26 lithotripsy machines and
facilities for computed tomography in every hospital with
over 200 beds. lo Overmedication is also encouraged, par-
ticularly in Korea' and China," where drugs account for
57% and 50% of the respective health insurance budgets.
Primary care has usually been neglected in NHI-
funded systems. In most cases, primary care through NHI
entails payments to urban private practitioners. Fee-for-
service remuneration has stimulated overservicing, as in
Korea, where the number of consultations per illness
episode rose from 3 in 1980 10 5 in 1990.10 There are,
however, imponant exceptions to.this trend, in which pri-
mary care is provided through health centres. Urban poly-
clinics were developed by social security institutes in a
number of Latin American countries, with sufficient scale
efficiently 10 provide a mixture of general and specialist
care." Brazil has about 7 000 polyclinics, in addition 10
10 000 (mostly public) health posts and centres.' Health
maintenance organisations (HMOs), emphasising primary
care in urban areas, have expanded in Brazil and
Uruguay.",31 Costa Rica greatly increased the distribution
of health centres in rural areas, but this was largely under-
taken by the government.25
Curative care has been emphasised, frequently at the
expense of preventive and promotive care. While social
security health spending increased in Brazil between 1978
and 1982, government spending on communicable dis-
ease control decreased by 41 %, including a drop of 57%
for malaria and 80% for schistosomiasis.3•
The inefficiencies described have led 10 steeply escalat-
ing costs in most of the countries reviewed, they have
responded to these by increasing premiums and co-pay-
ments and cutting benefits.""" Some have attempted to
change methods of paying providers but have at times met
resistance. In Korea, for example, doctors successfully
resisted limits to excessive remuneration for drug pre-
scription, which is a major source of income.' Cost con-
trol is possible, however, in countries with near-universal
1'\THI coverage, as has been shown by European countries
during the 1980s,'· but has only been achieved through
government and insurance institute intervention in health
care. Central control of health care funding through nn
could enable redirection of resources to the most efficient
forms of care, I but engagement of insurance institutes and
the government in health care organisation is crucial."
Organisation
Forms of public sector control of NHI vary widely. In
South Korea the health ministry plays a minimal role, e.g.
it restricts the establishment of new hospitals: IO In Brazil,
by contrast, the entire insurance system is based within
the health ministry.' The degree of real control may how-
ever be unclear. In Brazil, the social security institute
retained much of the staff and structure it had before its
incorporation into the ministry when it wielded more eco-
nomic and institutional power than did the rest of the
ministry (personal communication -:- J. Castro). In none
of the countries reviewed has 1'\THI been an integral part of
a unified government-provided national health service.
Insurance systems have usually developed piecemeal,
with multiple institutes. Fragmented institutes may result
in inefficient administration, inadequate risk pooling,
unequal benefits and less cross-subsidisation. In many
countries, encouraged by governments, the institutes have
merged. In Brazil, seven institutes merged into one,
covering the entire population of 150 million.' In others,
such as Korea (vlith 408 institutes)," Argentina (320),'
and Colombia (171),'0 insurance systems remain frag-
"memed.
A major choice is whether a NHI institute should pro-
vide care itself - the 'direct' method - or whether it
should purchase services from private or public providers
- the 'indirect' method."" The early decades of Latin
American 1'\THI were characterised by direct provision, in
which salaried professionals served beneficiaries in hospi-
tals and clinics owned by social security institutes."
During the 1970s and 1980s the indirect method became
predominant in Latin American and Asian 1'\THI, although
the direct method is still dominant in India and
Turkey. ',',24 While each method has advantages and disad-
vantages, the direct method allows greater control over
the provision of services, and is being reconsidered in a
number of countries.'
HMOs can be seen as a form of insurance in which
care is provided by the insurer, HMOs cover one-half of
the Uruguayan population,'· and expanded greatly in
Brazil during the 19805.31 Potential limitations of HMOs
include exclusion of less healthy populations, neglect of
prevention, incentives 10 enrol too many patients and
undemeat them, and failure in rural areas.'· Managed
care can take many forms, however, and some of these
probkms could be avoided through careful design,
including a judicious combination of incentives and regu-
lation.'· South African trade unions, employers and doc-
tors have shown a growing interest in managed care, and
it may be possible for HMOs of some kind to be a major
source of prepaid urban health care.
These examples show that NHI in South Africa could
be organised in a number of ways. In any case, the state
will need 10 take an active role in organising insurance
institutes, and in directing finances to areas of greatest
need. It is, however, likely that the urgent task of integrat-"
ing and improving existing public services that faces a
future health ministry will be so great that it will not have
the capacity simultaneously to manage the reorganisation
of private care through NHI. Equity and efficiency are
most likely where insurers, providers, the state and the
public have similar objectives, and where programmes are
co-ordinated. Conflicts of interest are inevitable, however,
and are played Out through overt or latent political pro-
cesses.
Mesa Lago" and Borzutsky·' have described how
social security in Latin America developed under multi-
class alliances of industrialists, the middle class (especially
government employees) and the organised working class,
and was a focus of intense bargaining!'··' The state used
social security to 'co-Opt, neutralise and control' pressure
groups." Much decision-making occurred outside fortnal
structures through elite networks, including government
officials, professionals, hospital owners, and social security
administrators. The power of social security institutes and
labour ministries was often greater than that of health
ministries. The privatisation drives of military regimes
changed direct provision of services by social security
institutes and public services to fee-for-service payment to
private providers. While the poor have generally been
excluded from these processes, more recently popular
pressures have prompted the expansion of coverage in
countries like Brazil and South Korea. These examples
show how powerful interest groups can influence the
direction of health care under :t\THI.
Conclusion
The evidence of countries economically comparable to
South Africa shows that rn:r can increase funding for
health care, but also poses major risks. If NID is used to
expand the present system of fee-for-service payment for
private care, the already critical inefficiencies and
inequities will be aggravated. An additional danger is that
government health resources could be drawn into expen-
sive ineffective care for the few. Efficiency can however be
increased under :t\THI by (7) directing of resources to those
services which will have the greatest impact on health, via
the development of a health system based on primary
care; (i7) continual evaluation of processes and outcomes
of care and critical assessment of new technology; and
(ii7) creation of financial incentives for providers of care,
especially doctors, to practise efficiently. Equity can be
increased by (7) ensuring that the entire population is enti-
tled to and has access to adequate care, regardless of their
ability to pay for it; and (7i) subsidisation by the wealthy of
the poor.
To promote health for all, NID needs to be linked to
an integrated national system of health care. Particularly
needed are programmes to ensure access for the poor in
rural and peri-urban areas, including the unemployed and
the elderly; this has been attempted in Brazil, Mexico and
Costa Rica. :t\THI has the potential to raise and direct large
sums of money equitably and efficiently, but it is not a
complete solution.
The author is grateful to Jonathan Broomberg, Diane
McIntyre and Merrick Zwarenstein for their critical com-
ments on the paper. This paper is based on a dissertation
submitted towards an M.Sc. (Public Health Medicine),
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 1992.
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